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Abstract 
 
 This thesis investigates the quality of audio generated by a G.711 codec and 
transmission over an IEEE 802.11n draft 2.0 wireless local area network (WLAN). 
Decline in audio quality due to additional calls or by securing the WLAN with transport 
mode Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is quantified. Audio quality over an IEEE 
802.11n draft 2.0 WLAN is also compared to that of IEEE 802.11b and IEEE 802.11g 
WLANs under the same conditions.  
  Audio quality is evaluated by following International Telecommunication Union 
Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) Recommendation P.800, where 
human subjects rate audio clips recorded during various WLAN configurations. The 
Mean Opinion Score (MOS) is calculated as the average audio quality score given for 
each WLAN configuration. An 85% confidence interval is calculated for each MOS. 
 Results suggest that audio quality over an IEEE 802.11n draft 2.0 WLAN is not 
higher than over an IEEE 802.11b WLAN when up to 10 simultaneous G.711 calls occur. 
A linear regression of the subjective scores also suggest that an IEEE 802.11n draft 2.0 
WLAN can sustain an MOS greater than 3.0 (fair quality) for up to 75 simultaneous 
G.711 calls secured with WPA2, or up to 40 calls secured with both WPA2 and transport 
mode IPsec. The data strongly suggest that toll quality audio (MOS ≥ 4.0) is not currently 
practical over IEEE 802.11 WLANs secured with WPA2, even with the G.711 codec. 
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SUBJECTIVE AUDIO QUALITY OVER A SECURE IEEE 802.11N DRAFT 2.0 
WIRELESS LOCAL AREA NETWORK 
I. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
 Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and IEEE 802.11 wireless local area 
networks (WLANs) are two technologies that have experienced rapid growth over the 
past decade. Many companies now offer VoIP service to homes and businesses for 
significantly less cost than traditional analog phone service. VoIP can be less expensive 
because it shares the same infrastructure as IP data networks. VoIP architectures can also 
scale more easily and offer greater flexibility to customers [BLG07]. Wireless network 
protocols such as IEEE 802.11 (hereafter referred to as 802.11) provide users with mobile 
connectivity without the need for expensive and inflexible wiring. The 802.11n 
extension, for instance, is currently undergoing the final stages of development and will 
provide bandwidth up to 600 Mbps [Bro06], which could make a complete transition to 
wireless networking feasible in many situations. The combination of these two 
technologies, however, creates serious challenges to both audio quality and security. 
 The most common protocols used for VoIP do not provide encryption or 
authentication. Many VoIP architectures use Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), Real time 
Transport Protocol (RTP), and User Datagram Protocol (UDP), all of which are 
vulnerable to interception and manipulation. Potential solutions to securing VoIP include 
substituting RTP with Secure RTP (SRTP) or encrypting all IP traffic with Internet 
Protocol Security (IPsec). WLANs must also be encrypted to prevent unauthorized access 
to the network and interception of traffic by malicious or curious individuals far beyond 
the building walls. 
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 The wireless medium introduces considerable challenges to VoIP audio quality. 
Wireless 802.11 physical and data-link layers are more vulnerable to packet loss, 
interference, and lower peak transmission rates than wired networks [GaK03]. This is 
primarily due to the shared wireless medium, where collisions are unavoidable. VoIP 
audio quality declines when packets are dropped, experience excessive latency (>150 
ms), or jitter [CFK06]. All of these factors are potential issues for WLAN traffic. 
Encryption techniques such as WPA, WPA2, and IPsec increase bit overhead and 
computation times which can further reduce VoIP audio quality over the WLAN.  
 When the 802.11n extension is finalized, it is likely to be adopted very rapidly as 
a viable alternative to completely wired networks due to its high potential throughput. 
Hardware is already available based on draft 2.0, which is expected to be very similar to 
the ratified standard [Bro06]. However, before the DoD considers 802.11n WLANs for 
real-time applications, such as VoIP, the effect that properly securing the WLAN has on 
audio quality must be well understood. 
 
1.2 Research Goals 
  
The overall goal of this research is to characterize VoIP audio quality over a 
secure 802.11n draft 2.0 WLAN. This research examines whether or not audio quality is 
higher over a secure 802.11n draft 2.0 WLAN than over secure 802.11b or 802.11g 
WLANs when up to 10 calls occur simultaneously. The research also aims to quantify 
audio quality decline due to additional simultaneous calls and the use of Internet Protocol 
Security (IPsec). To accomplish these goals, subjective audio scores are collected and 
used to construct a predictive mathematical model of audio quality over an 802.11n draft 
2.0 WLAN. 
3 
1.3 Thesis Layout 
 
This chapter introduces the motivation behind the thesis research. Chapter II 
provides background information on the research topic and also summarizes the results of 
recent related research. Chapter III details the methodology used to perform the 
experiments. Chapter IV presents an analysis of the experimental results. Chapter V 
discusses conclusions from the results and offers suggestions for future research. 
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II. Background and Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
  This chapter provides an introduction to VoIP, its use over secure wireless 
networks, and previous research into how security protocols affect voice quality over 
802.11 WLANs. Section 2.2 provides an overview of VoIP over WLANs. Section 2.3 
provides an introduction to VoIP signaling protocols. Section 2.4 describes how the 
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is used to initiate VoIP calls. Section 2.5 describes how 
voice data is transported via the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP). Section 2.6 
describes different voice codecs and how they are used in a VoIP system. Section 2.7 
describes the factors that negatively impact voice quality for VoIP calls. Section 2.8 
illustrates methods for obtaining Mean Opinion Score (MOS) and how MOS measures 
the audio quality of a VoIP system. Section 2.9 describes several 802.11 protocol 
extensions. Section 2.10 outlines the data link layer security protocols available for 
802.11 networks, and Section 2.11 describes additional WLAN measures available to 
secure VoIP calls. Section 2.12 describes related research efforts into the impact of 
security on audio quality over 802.11 WLANs.  
 
2.2 VoIP over WLANs Overview 
 
 The transition from analog to digital technologies for voice transmission has seen 
steady progress since the mid 1990s. Many companies now offer VoIP services to homes 
and businesses for significantly less cost than traditional analog services. VoIP service 
can be less expensive because it shares the same infrastructure as IP data networks. 
Instead of separate installations of phone and data lines, only IP network connectivity is  
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required. VoIP architectures can also scale more easily, provide better centralized control, 
and can integrate with new computer applications [Wal05]. 
 There are difficulties in employing VoIP as a total telephony solution. Voice calls 
made over the public Internet are not guaranteed a particular quality of service (QoS). 
However, QoS measures can be taken, particularly on the local network, to help ensure 
voice calls are of high quality and with low delay. Security is also a major issue with 
VoIP implementations [GuS07]. Because VoIP shares the IP data network infrastructure 
and technologies, it also inherits and contributes to the same well-known vulnerabilities. 
Properly securing a VoIP system is essential, but can be a time-consuming task for large 
networks. Possible attacks on a VoIP system include call interception, audio injection, 
data theft, spoofed caller ID, denial-of-service (DoS), and spam over Internet telephony 
(“spit”). 
 The increasing popularity of 802.11 WLANs is due to their flexibility and low 
cost of installation. As VoIP rapidly replaces analog phone systems, voice traffic will be 
delivered more frequently over WLANs. However, WLANs introduce significant 
challenges to VoIP call quality, particularly under limited-bandwidth or high-utilization 
conditions. WLANs must also be carefully secured from unauthorized access. 
 
2.3 VoIP Signaling Protocols 
 
  Before VoIP end devices exchange real-time traffic they must first use signaling 
protocols to establish a multimedia session. There are two primary architectures for 
establishing these sessions: H.323 and Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). When the first 
draft of H.323 was published by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 
1996, it was adopted as an effective means of establishing multimedia services on local 
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area networks. The H.323 architecture was developed with the same philosophy as the 
Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), where calls typically occur between two 
distant ends.  
 SIP, on the other hand, was first published by the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) in 1999 and was developed from an Internet perspective where communication 
between users is less structured. The protocol messages in the SIP architecture are sent in 
plain text, as opposed to the binary formats used with H.323. This makes it much easier 
to develop multimedia applications using SIP. The most recent version of SIP is 
described in RFC 3261 [SIP02]. In addition to H.323 and SIP, there are other VoIP 
signaling protocols including Cisco’s proprietary Skinny Call Control Protocol (SCCP), 
Media Gateway Control Protocol (MGCP), and Megaco/H.248 [NIS05].  
 While SIP has grown in popularity over the last few years, no one signaling 
protocol is used in the majority of VoIP systems. Regardless of the signaling protocol 
used, Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) or one of its secure variations is used to deliver 
the real-time media packets.  
 
2.4 SIP Architecture 
 
 SIP is a text-based application-layer protocol that is responsible for the 
establishment, modification, and termination of multimedia sessions [SIP02]. SIP is used 
in conjunction with other IETF protocols to implement a complete multimedia solution. 
Furthermore, the SIP architecture is transport-independent and can be used with either 
TCP or UDP over an IP network. Figure 1 illustrates the different protocols used in the 
SIP architecture, and these protocols are discussed further in the following sections. 
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Figure 1. SIP Architecture Protocol Stack [Sey07] 
 
 
 End-system applications in a SIP implementation are known as User Agents 
 (UA), and the hardware that runs a UA is called a SIP terminal. When requests arrive, 
the UA receives them and returns responses on behalf of the user. 
 Call setup under the SIP architecture is relatively simple. Sessions can be 
arranged through proxies or between UAs directly. Figure 2 illustrates how a typical call 
takes place between two UAs (User A and User B) that register with a proxy. In this 
example the UAs both send a REGISTER request to the proxy with the “from” and “to” 
address fields set to their own SIP address. A SIP address is similar to an email address, 
and it takes the form sip:username@domain.com. User A initiates a session with User B 
by sending an INVITE message to the proxy. This message includes the username of the 
entity that User A wishes to invite and indicates the media type to be used. The proxy  
replies to User A with a TRYING 100 message and forwards the request to User B. Upon 
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Figure 2. Example of SIP Call Flow [VoI06] 
 
 
receiving the INVITE message, User B sends a TRYING 100 message to the proxy and 
then a RING 180 message when the phone begins to ring. When User B picks up the 
phone or otherwise accepts the session an OK 200 message is sent. When User A 
receives the OK 200 from User B, it replies with an acknowledgement. The call is then 
established, and the RTP session begins. Once complete, one of the UAs terminates the 
call with a SIP BYE message and the other replies with an acknowledgement.  
 
2.5 Real-Time Transport Protocol  
 Regardless of the signaling protocol, RTP or one of its secure variants is  
used to stream real-time data. RTP is described in RFC 3550, which has been in its 
current form since July 2003 [RTP03]. RTP does not operate over a default port, but 
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traditionally uses an even-numbered UDP port. There are no QoS guarantees provided by 
RTP, and packets can be delivered out of sequence. Proper ordering and parallel 
processing of delivered packets is possible because each packet includes a sequence 
number and time stamp. The packet size and transmission frequency of RTP packets is 
dependent on the audio or video codec used.  
 Figure 3 illustrates the packet structure of RTP for audio transmissions. The first 
20 bytes of the RTP packet is the IPv4 header information, including source and 
destination IP address. The 8 byte UDP header follows, including source and destination 
ports and a checksum. Next is the 12 byte RTP header which includes media payload 
type, sequence number, timestamp, synchronization source identifier, and contributing 
source identifiers. The audio data consists of the compressed voice signals and can range 
from 5 to 160 bytes in length. 
 The Real-time Control Protocol (RTCP) is also outlined by RFC 3550. Its traffic 
takes place on one port higher than the RTP stream and provides feedback about quality 
of service by collecting statistics about the data stream such as jitter, round trip time, and 
dropped packets. Implementation of RTCP is optional, but can be useful for monitoring 
VoIP performance. 
 As an example of how RTCP can be used to improve VoIP performance, research 
by Sfairopoulou, Macian, and Bellalta [SMB06] demonstrates that the impact of data rate 
changes on a multi-rate WLAN has on audio quality can be corrected using a  
 
IPv4 Header 
 (20 Bytes) 
UDP 
Header 
(8 Bytes) 
RTP Header 
(12 Bytes) 
Audio Data  
(5-160 Bytes, codec-dependent) 
 
Figure 3. RTP Packet Structure 
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combination of RTCP and MAC layer feedback. Their simulated VoIP system switches 
to a lower bit rate codec when the WLAN data rate declines, preventing dropped calls. 
2.6 Audio Codecs 
  Before analog voice signals can be transported over an IP network, they must 
first be sampled and digitized. The method used to perform this compression and 
subsequent decompression of the analog data is called a codec. Many codecs have been 
devised for use in VoIP systems, and they vary greatly in their bandwidth requirements 
and call quality as shown in Table 1. For example, the G.711 codec operates at 64 kbps 
while the highly compressed G.723.1 protocol only uses 5.3 kbps.  
 
Table 1. VoIP Audio Codec Data Rates and Typical MOS 
Codec Bit Rate Sample Period Frame Size (# Per Packet) 
Typical 
MOS 
G.711 64 kbps 20 ms 160 bytes (1) 4.1 
G.729 8 kbps 10 ms 10 bytes (2) 3.92 
G.723.1 6.3 kbps  30 ms 24 bytes (1) 3.9 
G.729a 8 kbps 10 ms 10 bytes (2) 3.7 
G.723.1 5.3 kbps 30 ms 24 bytes (1) 3.65 
 
 The G.711 codec is also known as Pulse Code Modulation (PCM). It was one of 
the earliest codecs and is still very popular because it offers the highest audio quality. It 
samples the audio input at 8 kHz and represents each sample with a 14 bit linear input 
code. This linear input code is then compressed to 8 bits by replacing all values within 
256 ranges with the same number. From this it is straightforward to derive the payload 
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bitrate: (8 kHz x 8 bits = 64 kbps). Packets are transmitted 50 times per second, each 
representing 20 ms of audio as 160 bytes. 
 Other codecs decrease the bandwidth requirements by compressing the audio 
data. One of the most compressed codecs is G.723.1. With a payload bitrate of 5.3 kbps,  
G.723.1 requires 88% less bandwidth than the G.711 codec. Although lower bandwidth 
requirements are desirable, the extensive compression used in codecs such as G.723.1 
and G.729 comes at the expense of some audio quality.  
 The call quality provided by VoIP system can be measured as the mean opinion 
score (MOS). The MOS is a number from 1 (bad quality) to 5 (excellent) and can be 
derived from actual listeners or by an analytical model, such as the E-model [PMA+05]. 
An MOS of 4.5 is the highest probable score to result from a large subject pool and is 
therefore the maximum score predicated by the E-model. As shown in Table 1 the typical 
MOS of the highly compressed G.723.1 codec is 3.65, compared to a typical MOS of 4.1 
for G.711. 
 
2.7 Factors that Impact VoIP Audio Quality 
 
 Evaluating the audio quality of a VoIP system is non-trivial because IP networks 
are nondeterministic. IP networks offer a “best effort” level of service where packets can 
arrive at their destination after long delays, out of order, or not at all. This is in stark 
contrast to the circuit switching paradigm of the public telephone network, where end 
users are granted dedicated connections. All irregularity in VoIP packet delivery between 
source and destination can negatively impact call quality, while edge devices can also 
have a significant impact, depending on how they respond to irregular packet delivery 
[Bro06a]. 
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2.7.1 Network Impact on VoIP Audio Quality 
 
 The network can impact VoIP call quality three general ways: packet loss, packet 
delay, and jitter. RTP relies on the connectionless UDP protocol for end-to-end transport; 
therefore dropped packets are a distinct possibility. VoIP packets can be lost due to  
network congestion, excessive latency, or faulty hardware at any point between users. 
Network congestion can be managed on the local network by keeping the utilization low. 
Although the audio codec may only require 5-64 kbps, 50-100% more bandwidth is 
necessary to prevent full network utilization and to ensure timely packet delivery. The 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) reports that packet loss in excess 
of 3% results in intolerable call quality [NIS05]. 
 Packet delay also has a strong impact on VoIP performance. Long delays impede 
real-time communication because they prevent natural conversation. Significant delay 
can also introduce echo. In some cases, such as satellite communications, propagation 
delays in excess of 250 ms occur and are unavoidable. However, the ITU-T 
recommendation G.114 states that end-to-end delays should be kept to less than 150 ms 
to prevent performance degradation [ITU03]. 
 Jitter is the variable delay between packet arrivals. Because IP networks are 
dynamic, a stream of packets can encounter different queuing delays and even follow 
different routes through the network. Jitter impacts the call quality by introducing 
variable latency into the conversation. De-jitter buffers are very common in VoIP end 
devices in order to remove this variability. However, de-jitter buffers also contribute to 
the end-to-end delay. For example, a 25 ms de-jitter buffer could remove the effect of 
jitter less than 25 ms, but would also introduce a fixed 25 ms delay into the system. If the 
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de-jitter buffer is too small then excessively delayed packets will be dropped. NIST 
recommends that jitter be kept below 40 ms [NIS05].  
 
2.7.2 Other Factors that Impact VoIP Call Quality 
 
 Voice traffic over 802.11 WLANs faces additional challenges. Compared to wired 
networks, WLANs experience more events where packet delivery is delayed by several 
hundred milliseconds [CFK06]. WLANs are also vulnerable to radio frequency 
interference (RFI). RFI can come from neighboring networks, poorly shielded 
electronics, or other devices operating in the same frequency range (2.4 or 5 GHz). It has 
been repeatedly demonstrated [CFK06, GaK03, Sey07] that the true simultaneous VoIP 
call capacity of an 802.11 WLAN is significantly less than simple bandwidth calculations 
would indicate. 
 The 802.11e standard is an amendment to the original 802.11 MAC layer that 
offers QoS enhancements for delay-sensitive applications. Data priority is specified by an 
Access Category (AC). The four ACs, in order from highest to lowest priority are Voice, 
Video, Best Effort, and Background [MLL+07]. Separate queues are maintained for the 
traffic in each AC so that lower-priority traffic always yields. In the event of a collision, 
the back off timer for high-priority traffic is also set to be lower than for lower ACs. 
WLAN hardware that supports 802.11e is widely available and is highly recommended 
for real-time applications [MLL+07]. 
 
2.8 Methods for Obtaining MOS  
 
 Speech quality is inherently subjective, as it is established by human perception. 
Naturally, the most straightforward test of audio quality is to poll a large number of users. 
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However, subjective tests are very time-consuming and cannot be conducted in real-time. 
Analytical methods for determining MOS have thus been developed that use VoIP traffic 
measurements such as packet loss, latency, and codec type to estimate MOS. The 
advantage of analytical methods is that they can be performed very quickly and in real-
time. But unlike subjective tests, analytical models cannot consider conversational factors 
such as echo and background noise that further degrade audio quality.  
 
2.8.1 Subjective Methods for Obtaining MOS 
 
 Subjective testing is considered the most reliable approach to assessing voice 
quality [DRE+07]. Several widely-used approaches to subjective audio assessment are 
defined in ITU-T Recommendation P.800 [ITU96]. The P.800 recommendation describes 
both conversation-opinion and listening-only methods. Conversation-opinion tests are 
designed to most accurately reproduce in the laboratory the same service conditions as 
experienced by VoIP users [ITU96]. To achieve this level of fidelity, the experimenter 
must accurately specify, measure, and setup each experiment to ensure that the test 
conditions match those of the actual system. The P.800 recommendation also describes 
listening-option tests. These tests measure audio quality as delivered from a source 
through the system to a human listener. 
 The most commonly used listening test described in the P.800 recommendation is 
called Absolute Category Rating (ACR). For this test, human subjects rate the quality of 
audio recordings over the VoIP system on a scale from one (bad quality) to five 
(excellent quality). Table 2 illustrates the relationship between listening quality and 
subjective score for the ACR test. 
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Table 2. ACR Quality Rating Scale Recommended by the ITU-T [ITU96] 
 
Listening quality Score 
Excellent 5 
Good 4 
Fair 3 
Poor 2 
Bad 1 
 
 
 Another subjective test described in ITU-T recommendation P.800 is the 
Comparison Category Rating (CCR) method where test subjects are presented with a pair 
of speech samples during each trial. The ordering of the original and processed signals is 
random but ultimately balanced so that the original signal is presented first during half of 
the trials and second during the other half [ITU96]. Subjects provide judgment on the 
second audio sample as compared to the first quantify by how much with a number as 
shown in Table 3.  
 
 
Table 3. CCR Quality Rating Scale Recommended by the ITU-T [ITU96] 
 
Much Better 3 
Better 2 
Slightly Better 1 
About the Same 0 
Slightly Worse -1 
Worse -2 
Much Worse -3 
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 Test audio clips for both the ACR and CCR tests should consist of between 2 and 
5 short, meaningful phrases that are played in random order. For example, “You will 
have to be very quiet.” and “I want a minute with the inspector.” are possibilities. 
Because subjective testing results in interaction between the experimenter and subjects, 
great care must be taken to not influence the outcome. No suggestion should be given to 
the subjects about technical details, anticipated audio sample quality, or the list of phrases 
they could hear. 
 
2.8.2 Analytical Methods for Obtaining MOS 
  
 The E-model is a commonly cited computational model for determining MOS and 
is defined by ITU-T recommendation G.107. The E-model estimates MOS based on the 
principle that network impairments correspond to calculable decreases in perceived audio 
quality. The E-model’s evaluation of the call quality is given as an R value by  
             R = R0 – Is – Id – Ie                        (1) 
where R0 is the signal-to-noise ratio, Is represents impairments that occur simultaneously 
with the voice signal, Id is the impairment caused by delay, and Ie is the impairment 
caused by low bit rate codecs. The R-value is then mapped to approximate MOS by  
   MOS = 1 + 0.035R + 7(10-6R)(R-60)(100-R).         (2) 
For example, an R value of 40 equates to an approximate MOS of 2.06 [Baj03]. 
 Another objective audio quality model is the Perceptual Evaluation of Speech 
Quality (PESQ), which estimates perceived one-way audio quality as an MOS value 
[GLC07]. PESQ is described in ITU-T Recommendation P.862 [ITU01] and estimates 
speech quality by comparing the original, unprocessed audio signal with the degraded 
version at the system output. First, a reference speech signal is sent through the system 
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under test. The degraded signal is then recorded at the system output. Then the average 
power of the reference speech signal and the degraded signal are matched. Finally, 
software or hardware designed to implement the PESQ algorithm [ITU01] compares the 
two signals to estimate MOS at the system output. 
 PESQ was developed to approximate MOS without the need for time-consuming 
trials with human subjects. It is useful for detecting audio quality decline due to packet 
loss, codec selection, and real-time testing of prototype networks [Min02].  
2.9 IEEE 802.11 Protocol Extensions 
 The IEEE created the first WLAN standard, 802.11, in 1997. This legacy standard 
supports a theoretical maximum bandwidth of 2 Mbps. Over time, 802.11 has been 
expanded to include faster and more capable extensions, including 802.11b (≤ 11 Mbps), 
802.11a (≤ 54 Mbps), and 802.11g (≤ 54 Mbps) [Bro03]. The 802.11n (≤ 600 Mbps) 
[Bro06] extension is also under development, although equipment is already being sold 
based on the most recent draft (2.0). IEEE 802.11a operates in the 5 GHz band, while 
802.11b and 802.11g devices operate in the 2.4 GHz band. The 802.11n can function in 
either frequency band, depending on the frequencies employed by other clients on the 
WLAN [Bro06]. 
 
2.10 Link Layer Security Measures for 802.11 WLANs 
 
 WLANs are inherently more vulnerable to attack than their wired counterparts. 
Without security measures, anyone within range of the WLAN can access and exploit 
network resources. Fortunately, several security measures are available. 
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2.10.1 Wired Equivalent Privacy 
 The first data link layer algorithm designed to encrypt data on the WLAN is 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). WEP was introduced in 1999 to provide 
confidentiality on par with wired networks using a secret key which can be 40, 104, or 
128 bits long. WEP was quickly discovered to be cryptographically weak and current 
tools can crack its key in minutes or less [BHL06]. Even though WEP offers trivial 
network protection, it is still in widespread use, particularly in home networks. This can 
be attributed a combination of legacy hardware support, user ignorance, and indifference 
with respect to WLAN security. 
 As shown in Figure 4, WEP uses the RC4 cipher, where plain text data is XORed 
with a shared secret key. The algorithm begins when the plain-text 802.11 frame is 
queued for transmission. Then an integrity check value (ICV) is calculated for the header 
and payload using a 32 bit Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC-32) and appended to the 
payload [Gas05]. Meanwhile, a 64 to 256 bit long “WEP seed” is created by appending 
the 40-232 bit secret key with a 24-bit initialization vector (IV). Then the payload/ICV 
combination and WEP seed are run through the RC4 algorithm. The RC4 output is sent as 
the encrypted payload and the IV, key number, and ICV are included in the frame as 
plain text to allow the recipient to decrypt the frame by following the process in reverse. 
 The major flaw in WEP is that the IV, integral to the encryption algorithm, has a 
relatively small number of possible values (224, or less than 17 million). Moreover, in 
most implementations of WEP, the secret key is static and the IV is necessarily 
transmitted in the clear. Therefore two frames that share the same IV are most likely also 
encrypted with the same WEP seed. Furthermore, the CRC algorithm is not 
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Figure 4. WEP Encryption Algorithm [Gas05] 
 
 
cryptographically secure [Gas05]. Using these facts, a cracking program such as Aircrack 
can determine the secret key by examining only 1,000,000 frames [BHL06]. 
 
2.10.2 Wi-Fi Protected Access  
  
 In order to address the flaws discovered in WEP, the Wi-Fi alliance created the 
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) protocol as a stop-gap measure while the IEEE 802.11i 
security standard was developed. WPA incorporates many of the features of the final 
IEEE 802.11i standard and was designed to be compatible with legacy hardware through 
firmware upgrades. WPA keys can be distributed using a key authority or set as a fixed 
Pre-shared Key (PSK). The IV is lengthened to 48 bits, increasing the number of possible 
values to over 281 trillion. Another major improvement over WEP is the Temporal Key 
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Integrity Protocol (TKIP), illustrated in Figure 5. Unlike WEP, where the secret key is 
applied directly, TKIP encrypts the frames with keys that are derived from the master key 
[Gas05]. The per-frame keys are calculated using a process called key mixing. 
Furthermore, Message Integrity Check (MIC) is used in place of the more vulnerable 
CRC and is computed by an algorithm called Michael.  Sequence numbers are also added 
to the frames to protect against spoofing. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. TKIP Encryption Algorithm [Gas05] 
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2.10.3 Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (802.11i) 
  
 Full implementation of the IEEE 802.11i security standard is also known as 
WPA2. The WPA2 standard was ratified in 2004 and further increases the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of WLANs beyond that of WEP and WPA. Whereas WPA was 
meant to strengthen the WEP protocol, WPA2 mandates a completely different 
encryption standard, Counter Mode with CBC-MAC (CCMP). CCMP incorporates the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher with 128 bit keys. WPA2 uses two 
types of keys - group keys for broadcast and multicast traffic, and pairwise keys for 
unicast traffic [Gas05]. As a block cipher, AES encrypts and decrypts messages in 128-
bit blocks. If the message length is not evenly divisible by 128 bits, it is padded to meet 
this requirement and the padding is discarded during decryption. 
 Integrity with WPA2 is provided by XORing every 128-bit cyphertext block with 
the following 128-bit block until the entire message integrity code (MIC) is computed 
[SAN04]. Only the first 64 bits of the MIC are used to verify message integrity, but this 
is sufficient to ensure that the message has not been altered in transit [SAN04]. 
 While WPA and WPA2 provide strong encryption for 802.11WLANs, the PSK 
implementation of both is more vulnerable than when keys are dynamic and distributed 
via server. If a weak PSK is chosen, it can be cracked by a dictionary or brute-force 
attack. A passphrase of at least 20 characters that includes letters, numbers, and special 
characters is considered secure. However, since PSKs are stored on end devices, they 
could potentially be retrieved from any authorized device on the WLAN. 
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2.11 VoIP Security Protocols 
2.11.1 Internet Protocol Security  
 
 Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) provides authentication and confidentiality for 
IP networks. IPsec provides security for VoIP by encrypting the entire header and 
payload of every packet. The encrypted packets are then encapsulated by an unencrypted 
IP header and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) header [XiZ04]. IPsec can use Data 
Encryption Standard (DES), Triple DES (3DES), or the Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) to perform encryption. Although it provides very strong security, IPsec introduces 
additional headers and processing requirements and can increase the VoIP bandwidth 
requirements by 37% [XiZ04]. The additional headers have a significant impact on VoIP 
traffic because voice packets are only 50 to 200 bytes long. Figure 6 illustrates a packet 
protected with transport mode IPsec, while Figure 7 illustrates a packet protected with 
tunnel mode IPsec. In transport mode IPsec, the IP header is left unencrypted, followed 
by an ESP header that provides authentication, and the transport layer data and higher is 
encrypted. For tunnel mode IPsec, an unencrypted IP header is added and the original 
packet and header are encrypted. 
 
 
Figure 6. Transport Mode IPsec Packet [Car06] 
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Figure 7. Tunnel Mode IPsec Packet [Car06] 
 
 
2.11.2 Secure Real-time Transport Protocol  
  
 Real-time traffic itself can be encrypted by substituting RTP with a secure real-
time protocol such as Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP). SRTP was introduced 
in 2004 to provide confidentiality, message authentication, and replay protection for RTP 
and RTCP [IET04a]. With SRTP the RTP payload is encrypted using AES and message 
integrity is provided by a SHA1 hash. Two types are keys are used, session keys and 
master keys. Session keys are derived from the master key, and the master key can be 
periodically changed through a key management mechanism external to SRTP. 
 Key distribution mechanisms are not specified in the SRTP standard so several 
techniques are in use. If SIP is employed, the key can simply be sent inside the SIP 
message using Session Description Protocol Security (SDPS) [ABW06]. However, SDPS 
does not encrypt the key so encryption must be achieved through another protocol, such 
as Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME). SDPS is, therefore, not a  
complete solution for secure key distribution. 
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 Another option for key distribution is the Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)  
standard. MIKEY was first published in RFC 3830 in 2004 [IET04]. The three 
approaches to key distribution as described by MIKEY are PSK, public key encryption, 
and the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. The use of PSKs is not scalable for large networks, 
therefore public key encryption and Diffie-Hellman techniques are more prevalent. The 
public key infrastructure used for DoD networks and maintained by the Defense 
Information Security Agency is an example of a large public key encryption solution. The 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm is scalable and requires less overhead cost than a 
public key infrastructure. 
 The Diffie-Hellman algorithm is asymmetric in that the method used to encrypt  
 
traffic differs from the decryption. It also relies on the discrete logarithm problem, where  
 
the best known algorithms cannot determine the exponential inverses of very large  
 
numbers in modulo arithmetic within a reasonable about of time. For example, consider  
 
two users, Alice and Bob, communicating privately using the Diffie-Hellman algorithm.  
 
First they agree to use the same large prime number p and base g. Next Alice computes  
 
her own private key a, and Bob computes his private key b. Then Alice sends Bob the  
 
value A = (ga mod p). Bob sends Alice the value B = (gb mod p). Alice and Bob arrive at 
 
 
Figure 8. Diffie-Hellman Man-in-the-Middle Attack [Cod07] 
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the same secret key value K by using their respective formulas (Alice: K = Ba mod p, 
Bob: K = Ab mod p). The two can then exchange traffic encrypted with the key K.  
 A significant vulnerability in the Diffie-Hellman algorithm is the man-in-the 
middle (MitM) attack. The encrypted traffic can be read by a third party if the entire 
exchange between Alice and Bob is intercepted. As shown in Figure 8, Carol can position 
herself to intercept traffic between Alice and Bob on the network, and then she can 
establish secure connections with them impersonating the other. It will appear to Alice 
and Bob that they have a secure connection directly with one another. Meanwhile Carol 
can decrypt the traffic as it arrives, re-encrypt it, and forward it to the recipient. 
 
2.11.3 Zimmerman Real-time Transport Protocol  
 
 In March of 2006 Phillip Zimmerman proposed Zimmerman RTP (ZRTP) which 
prevents MitM attack through the use of shared keys [Zim06]. The Zfone Project IP  
phone software uses ZRTP for key negotiation. ZRTP negotiation begins after the users 
have already used a signaling protocol, such as SIP, and are ready to transmit RTP 
packets. A Hello message is sent first to determine if the endpoints support the protocol 
and to see which algorithms are in common. A Short Authentication String (SAS) is 
calculated by a cryptographic hash of two Diffie-Hellman values and used for key 
confirmation. The communicating parties confirm this key verbally over the VoIP system 
by reading the SAS as displayed on a screen [Zim06]. ZRTP provides further protection 
from MitM attack by using some hashed key material for use in the next call. If the 
attacker did not intercept the last call, they will be unable to intercept the next.  
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2.12 Related Research 
 WLANs are exceptionally vulnerable to unauthorized access unless they are 
properly secured. VoIP traffic on the WLAN is also vulnerable and should be protected 
from eavesdropping, manipulation, and DoS. The combination of WLANs and VoIP 
creates challenges for security, capacity, and call quality that have been the subject of 
several research efforts.  
 Xiao and Zarrella [XiZ04] examine the impact of WEP and 3DES IPsec on voice 
quality over an 802.11b WLAN. They observe that, during a 300 second G.711 call, 
instantaneous MOS falls below 3.0 three times when no encryption is used, eight times 
when WEP is used, and five times when 3DES IPsec is used. The method used for 
determining MOS is not mentioned. 
 Nascimento, et al. [NPM+06] investigate the impact of AES and 3DES IPsec on 
call quality over an 802.11b network using the E-Model. Their results indicate that IPsec 
decreases audio quality, with a MOS approximately 0.25 lower with 3DES than with 
AES for up to sixteen G.711 calls. The AP-based 802.11b network sustains an MOS 
above 3.0 for 10 simultaneous G.711 calls secured with a 3DES IPsec VPN, 12 
simultaneous calls secured with an AES IPsec VPN, or 14 calls with no encryption.  
 Fathi, et al [FKC+05] measures the impact of MAC filtering and WEP on latency 
for an 802.11b AP-based network. Their results indicate that authentication delay roughly 
increases in proportion to WEP key length. 
 Rubino, Varela, and Bonnin [RVB05] use a neural network to measure MOS for 
voice calls made over an 802.11b AP-based network. The results suggest that MOS for a 
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single call can fall below 2 (poor) for 15 seconds at a time during “moderately high” 
network load. Their data suggest that 802.11b networks can barely support VoIP calls. 
 Gurkas, Zaim, and Aydin [GZA06] simulate the effects of WEP, WPA, and 
WPA2 on 802.11b and 802.11g WLAN performance. They conclude that WEP and WPA 
decrease network throughput by 1%, and that WPA2 decreases throughput by 4%. 
 Lawrence, Biswas, and Sahib [LBS07] examine the capability of 802.11a and 
draft 802.11n at handling G.711 VoIP traffic. Their results suggest that draft 802.11n 
underperformed 802.11a at delivering small packets in real-time. 
 Seyba [Sey07] evaluates the ability for 802.11g WLANs to transport secure audio 
and video. Human subjects are used to evaluate subjective MOS provided by different 
network topologies. The results indicate that true capacity of an AP-based 802.11g 
WLAN secured with WPA and SRTP is only two simultaneous audio conversations. This 
is substantially fewer than 802.11b simulation results by Nascimento, et al [NPM+06]. 
 Filho, et al [FFL+07] measure the impact of WEP 64, WEP 128, and WPA on the 
throughput of 802.11g networks. Their findings indicate that WEP 64, WEP 128, and 
WPA decrease UDP throughput by an average of 8%, 7%, and 6% respectively. 
 The number of simulated and modeled studies of voice quality over secure 802.11 
networks greatly outnumbers subjective experiments with actual listeners. There appears 
to be a great deal of disparity between the two as well, with subjective performance tests 
indicting that 802.11 networks are less capable of supporting VoIP calls than analytical 
models predict. 
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2.13 Conclusion 
 The impact of common security measures on 802.11b WLANs have been 
repeatedly modeled and simulated. However, the effects of security mechanisms on voice 
quality on new and higher bandwidth WLAN standards such as 802.11n draft 2.0 have 
not been thoroughly and subjectively measured. This thesis expands upon this 
understanding by investigating the impact of security measures on audio quality over an 
802.11n draft 2.0 WLAN. 
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III. Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter explains how the experiments are conducted and details the VoIP 
WLAN configurations. Section 3.2 discusses the problem definition. Section 3.3 explains 
the experiment design. Section 3.4 describes the experiment methodology, and Section 
3.5 explains in detail how the VoIP WLANs are configured.  
3.2 Problem Definition 
3.2.1 Goals  
 
 This experiment is designed to address three questions regarding VoIP audio 
quality over encrypted 802.11n draft 2.0 (hereafter referred to as 802.11n) WLANs: 
 
1). Is audio quality higher over an 802.11n WLAN than over 802.11b or 802.11g 
 WLANs when up to 10 simultaneous G.711 calls occur? 
2). How significant is the impact of additional calls on audio quality over an encrypted 
 802.11n WLAN? 
3). How significant is the impact of transport mode 3DES IPsec (hereafter referred to as 
 IPsec) on audio quality over a WPA2-encrypted 802.11n WLAN?   
  
3.2.2 Approach 
 
 These questions are addressed by building actual VoIP WLANs and having 
human test subjects subjectively rate audio quality. It is impractical to repeatedly 
reconfigure the VoIP WLANs for every subject during the audio evaluation, so 42 
different recordings are taken under each of 28 network scenarios for a total of 1176 
recordings. These recordings are what the human subjects hear and evaluate. As 
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demonstrated in Chapter 4, audio quality of the recordings is statistically 
indistinguishable from live WLAN audio.  
 
3.2.3 System Boundaries 
 
 The system under test (SUT), shown in Figure 9, is a VoIP WLAN consisting of 
the wireless medium, an 802.11b/g/n capable AP, VoIP private branch exchange (PBX) 
to direct VoIP traffic, and VoIP softphones on wireless laptops. The VoIP WLAN has a 
static topology, so physical positioning of the hardware is not part of the SUT. The 
component under test (CUT) is the 802.11 extension used. 
 The workload parameter is the number of simultaneous calls occurring on the 
VoIP WLAN. An increase in the number of simultaneous calls results in more bandwidth 
utilization, a greater probability of VoIP call distortion, and a greater computational load 
on the PBX. System parameters include the 802.11 extension used, and whether or not 
IPsec is implemented. The choice of 802.11 extension impacts the available WLAN 
bandwidth available for VoIP calls. Only 802.11b, 802.11g, and 802.11n are examined. 
WPA2 with IPsec or WPA2 without IPsec are the only levels of security for the SUT. 
 
 
Figure 9. System under Test 
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 The Metric used to evaluate the SUT VoIP call quality is MOS. It is a 
measurement of average listener perception of the VoIP call quality and is further 
explained in Section 3.4 
3.3 Experiment Design 
Twenty-eight network scenarios are divided into three trials to keep the testing 
periods short, and each trial is conducted with a different group of human subjects. 
Scenarios examined for Trials I, II, and III are listed in Tables 4, 5, and 6, respectively. 
Trial I examines audio quality over 802.11b, 802.11g, and 802.11n WLANs in order to 
evaluate differences in audio quality between the three 802.11 extensions. Trials II and 
III examine only 802.11n in order to characterize audio quality over a secure 802.11n 
WLAN during as many scenarios as possible. 
Figure 10 illustrates the logical path taken by the audio clips from the source to 
the human subject. In Scenario 13, the human subjects listen to the source audio as it is 
directly played into the headphones. In Scenarios 14, 21, and 28, source audio is recorded 
into X-Lite and played back to the subjects. For all other scenarios, source audio traverses 
the VoIP WLAN before it is evaluated by the subjects. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Logical Path of Audio through the SUT 
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Table 4. VoIP WLAN Scenarios Examined During Trial I 
 
802.11 Simultaneous Encryption
Scenario # Subjects Extension G.711 Calls Technique
1 1-42 802.11b 6 WPA2
2 1-42 802.11b 10 WPA2
3 1-42 802.11g 6 WPA2
4 1-42 802.11g 10 WPA2
5 1-42 802.11n 6 WPA2
6 1-42 802.11n 10 WPA2
7 1-42 802.11b 6 WPA2+IPsec
8 1-42 802.11b 10 WPA2+IPsec
9 1-42 802.11g 6 WPA2+IPsec
10 1-42 802.11g 10 WPA2+IPsec
11 1-42 802.11n 6 WPA2+IPsec
12 1-42 802.11n 10 WPA2+IPsec
13 1-42 *Source Audio File* N/A N/A
14 1-42 *X-Lite Recording* N/A N/A
 
 
 
Table 5. VoIP WLAN Scenarios Examined During Trial II  
 
802.11 Simultaneous Encryption
Scenario # Subjects Extension G.711 Calls Technique
15 43-84 802.11n 6 WPA2
16 43-84 802.11n 10 WPA2
17 43-84 802.11n 2 WPA2
18 43-84 802.11n 2 WPA2+IPsec
19 43-84 802.11n 4 WPA2
20 43-84 802.11n 4 WPA2+IPsec
21 43-84 *X-Lite Recording* N/A N/A
 
 
 
Table 6. VoIP WLAN Scenarios Examined During Trial III 
 
802.11 Simultaneous Encryption
Scenario # Subjects Extension G.711 Calls Technique
22 85-126 802.11n 6 WPA2+IPsec
23 85-126 802.11n 10 WPA2+IPsec
24 85-126 802.11n 14 WPA2
25 85-126 802.11n 14 WPA2+IPsec
26 85-126 802.11n 20 WPA2
27 85-126 802.11n 20 WPA2+IPsec
28 85-126 *X-Lite Recording* N/A N/A
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 The number of subjects (N) is selected to be 42 for each of the trials for the 
following reasons: 
 
1). (N = 42) is greater than 30, giving a reasonable expectation of distribution normality 
 
2). (N = 42) is greater than 36, the number of subjects in related work by Seyba [Sey07] 
 
3). (N = 42) is small enough to be experimentally practical  
4). (N = 42) is evenly divisible by 14 and 7, the number of scenarios in Trials I, II, and III 
  (This permits balanced listening orders, as explained below) 
 
 In order to prevent listening order from influencing the audio scores, every human 
subject evaluates audio from the network scenarios in a different order. Additionally, 
listening orders are balanced such that all scenarios are heard first by the same number of 
subjects. Latin squares are produced (similar to completed Sudoku puzzles) to 
accomplish this randomization and balanced listening order. Subject listening order for 
Trials I, II, and III are listed in Appendix C. Dashed lines are included only to illustrate 
the division between Latin squares. As an example of how to read the tables, Subject 1 in 
Trial I evaluates audio from Scenario 3 first, from Scenario 14 second, and from Scenario 
10 last. 
 While only two call levels are examined for 802.11b and 802.11g (6 and 10 
simultaneous calls), six call levels are examined for 802.11n (2, 4, 6, 10, 14, and 20 
simultaneous calls). This is done to more fully characterize audio quality resulting from 
the use of this new protocol. Additionally, a total of 84 human subjects evaluate audio 
quality for the 6 (Scenarios 5 and 15) and 10 (Scenarios 6 and 16) simultaneous call 
scenarios over 802.11n. This is done to narrow the confidence interval (CI) and give the 
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lowest possible upper bound for the decline in audio quality due to IPsec on an 802.11n 
WLAN.  
 For validation purposes, one of the scenarios in each trial (Scenarios 14, 21, and 
28) consist of source audio directly recorded into X-Lite from the CD player without 
transmission over the WLAN. This is done to verify that the three human subject pools 
provide the same MOS to audio of identical quality. Additionally, Scenario 13 consists of 
the source audio files played directly for the subject (no WLAN transmission) and used to 
verify that the source audio is of very high quality (MOS > 4.5). The X-Lite recording 
process must also be eliminated as a possible source of error by verifying that MOS from 
the direct recordings (Scenarios 14, 21, 28) are not statistically different from the source 
audio (Scenario 13). Finally, the distributions of subjective scores from all 28 scenarios 
are examined to verify that they are normally distributed and therefore not skewed. 
3.4 Experiment Methodology 
 Four studio-recorded source audio files from the ITU-T P.862 source code 
[ITU01] consisting of two spoken sentences each are used for this experiment. The four 
files are played in a continuous and random order from a CD player into the microphone 
input of one wireless laptop running an X-Lite softphone and recorded via the X-Lite 
softphone program of a recipient laptop. This method allows WPA2 and WPA2+IPsec 
encrypted audio to be recorded in the same manner.  
  Audio quality is subjectively rated according to the Absolute Category Rating 
(ACR) test described in ITU-T Recommendation P.800 [ITU96]. Subjects listen to short 
audio recordings taken from actual VoIP calls made over the WLAN and rate audio 
quality with an integer from 1 to 5. The subjective rating scale includes 1 (bad), 2 (poor), 
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3 (fair), 4 (good), and 5 (excellent) [ITU96]. Subjects individually hear and evaluate the 
audio recordings for quality in a quiet room. After each recording is played, the subject 
says aloud the score it deserves so that it can be written down by the experimenter. The 
Mean Opinion Scores (MOS) are calculated as the average subjective score for each 
WLAN configuration as given by human subjects.  
 The potential exists for nearby access points (APs) to create significant 
interference for the VoIP WLANs. Therefore, prior to data collection the wireless 802.11 
environment is monitored using the Kismet wireless network sniffer. Kismet is used to 
quantify the intensity of traffic from nearby APs and to verify minimal nearby WLAN 
activity. A representative screenshot of Kismet output is shown in Figure 11. In this 
figure, data such as neighboring AP SSIDs (“Name”), 802.11 channels in use (“Ch”), 
packets observed (“Packts”), and the average number of packets per second (“Pkts/s”) are 
visible.  
 Audio recordings are taken at AFIT within range of several other 802.11g APs as 
shown in Figure 11. Since 802.11 channel 1 is not active in the vicinity, it is used for the 
802.11b and 802.11g configurations. However, 802.11n uses a channel width of 40 MHz 
(twice as large as for 802.11b/g) so channel 4 is used for those scenarios to fit within 
the802.11 spectrum. For 802.11n, some operating frequency overlap with the nearby APs 
on channel 6 is unavoidable. In order to minimize interference from other APs, 
recordings are only made after 2000 hours on weekends, when ambient WLAN activity at 
AFIT is at a minimum (< 20 packets/sec across all channels). 
As with all research involving human subjects, approval is required from an 
institutional review board (IRB). Given that the subjects only listen to audio samples and  
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Figure 11. Example Screenshot of Kismet Output 
 
 
 are not exposed to potential harm, an exemption request from human experimentation 
equirements is obtained and is included in Appendix A. No personally identifiable 
information is recorded from any of the subjects, as explained on the subject information 
sheet shown to every subject prior to testing. This sheet is included in Appendix C.  
3.5 VoIP WLAN Configuration 
Figure 12 illustrates the VoIP WLAN physical topologies. In order to maximize 
WLAN performance, all laptops running software phones are relatively close to the AP 
(< 15m) and within line-of-sight of the AP. The WLAN topologies for Trials I and II 
require up to 10 wireless laptops with softphones, while Trial III requires up to 20. 
Although the physical topology for Trial I and II differs from that of Trial III, the small  
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                            Trials I and II            Trial III  
 
Figure 12. VoIP WLAN Topologies 
 
differences in relative hardware location do not have a statistically significant impact on 
WLAN performance or VoIP audio quality. This conclusion is based on a study of draft 
802.11n hardware by Veritest, which concludes that average throughput is essentially 
constant at distances less than 15 m from the AP [Ver06]. All trials use microphone 
headsets, X-Lite softphones, an 802.11b/g/n AP, and another laptop running trixbox as 
the private branch exchange (PBX). The PBX serves as a SIP proxy that manages all 
VoIP calls on the WLAN. Specifications for the WLAN components are listed in Table 7, 
and Figure 13 shows a configured wireless laptop with headset and softphone. 
 The VoIP WLANs are highly configurable in order to create the WLAN 
conditions examined. Variables include 802.11 extension (selected at the AP), number of 
simultaneous calls (made between pairs of laptop softphones), and use of WPA2 
encryption with or without IPsec (selected at the AP, PBX, and on each laptop). 
Appendix D explains IPsec configuration for the trixbox PBX, and Appendix E explains 
IPsec configuration for the wireless laptops. 
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Figure 13. A Configured Laptop with Softphone and Headset 
 
 
Table 7. VoIP WLAN Component Specifications 
 
D-Link DWA-643 Xtreme N PCMCIAWireless Cards
VoIP Softphones X-Lite 3.0, G.711 20 ms/frame
Microphone Headsets Plantronics Audio 625 Headset
Dell Latitude D630, T7300 Core 2 Duo, 1 
GB SDRAM, Windows XP Professional 
SP2
Caller/Callee 3-10 Laptops
802.11 b/g/n AP
Caller/Callee 1-2 Laptops
Specifications
Dell Latitude C840, 2 GB SDRAM, 
trixbox 2.6.1
Dell Latitude C840, 1.8 GHz P4-M,       
512 MB SDRAM, Windows XP    
Professional SP2
Component
VoIP PBX
D-Link 655 Xtreme N Gigabit Router, 
Firmware v1.11
 
X-Lite 3.0 
Softphone 
Plantronics Audio 
625 Headset 
D-Link DWA-643 
Xtreme N PCMCIA 
39 
 Advanced AP settings are primarily left to the factory default so only the 802.11 
extension (“802.11 Mode”) and channel width (in the case of 802.11n) is altered on the 
AP between scenarios. The full list of AP settings is displayed in Table 8.  
 Strong WLAN security is enforced with the selection of WPA2 encryption using 
AES, “Low” transmit power, “Invisible” status, and lengthy passphrase (20 characters).  
Also, the AP has a built-in QoS engine to help maximize VoIP audio performance. 
 
 
Table 8. VoIP WLAN AP Settings 
 
Option Setting 
Enable Wireless: Always 
802.11 Mode: 80211b only, 802.11g only, or 802.11n only 
Transmission Rate: Best (automatic) 
Channel Width: (for 802.11n) Auto 20/40 MHz  (fixed 40 MHz is not an option) 
Visibility Status: Invisible 
Security Mode: WPA-Personal 
WPA Mode: WPA2 Only 
Cipher Type: AES 
Group Key Update Interval: 3600 seconds 
DHCP Settings: Static IP addresses 
Transmit Power Low 
Beacon Period: 100 
RTS Threshold: 2346 
Fragmentation Threshold: 2346 
DTIM Interval: 1 
WLAN Partition: No 
WMM Enable: Yes (helps control latency and jitter) 
Short GI: Yes (short 400ns guard interval) 
Extra Wireless Protection: Yes 
Enable Traffic Shaping: Yes 
Auto Uplink Speed: Yes 
Connection Type: Auto-detect 
Enable QoS Engine: Yes 
Auto Classification: Yes 
Dynamic Fragmentation: Yes 
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 No changes from the default are made to the D-Link wireless network cards used 
in the laptops. These default driver settings are listed in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Wireless Network Card Driver Settings 
 
Option Setting 
Driver Provider: D-Link 
Driver Date: 8/28/2006 
Driver Version: 6.0.1.75 
802.11b Preamble: Long and Short 
Map Registers: 256 
Network Address: Not Present 
Power Save Mode: Normal 
Radio On/Off: On 
Scan Valid Interval: 60 
 
  
 
 In addition to the AP and wireless card settings, the preferences selected for the 
X-Lite softphones are important to note. The G.711 codec is used in order to maximize 
MOS provided by the VoIP network, since it has a higher typical MOS (4.1) than any 
other traditional (< 64 kbps) codec. The default device options used for the trixbox PBX 
are listed in Table 10. Important X-Lite VoIP settings are listed in Table 11.  
 
 
Table 10. Softphone Device Options Selected in Trixbox 
 
Option Setting 
Secret: blank 
Dtmf_mode: rfc2833 
Can_reinvite: No 
Context: from-internal 
Host: Dynamic 
Type: Friend 
Nat: Yes 
Port: 5060 
Qualify: yes 
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Table 11. X-Lite Softphone VoIP Settings 
Option Setting 
Speaker device: SigmaTel Audio 
Microphone device: SigmaTel Audio 
Use acoustic echo cancellation (AEC): Yes 
Use auto gain control (AGC): Yes 
Use noise reduction: Yes 
Enabled codecs: G.711 uLaw 
Preserve bandwidth during silence periods: No 
Reregister every: 3600 seconds 
Send SIP keep-alives: Yes 
Register with domain and receive incoming calls: Yes 
Send outbound calls via: domain 
Presence: Peer-to-peer 
 
3.5 Summary 
 This chapter describes the methodology used to quantify the impact of IEEE 
802.11 extension, additional calls, and IPsec encryption on audio quality over VoIP 
WLANs. Human subjects listen to audio samples taken during 28 WLAN scenarios and 
MOS is calculated with an 85% CI. 
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IV. Results and Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents analysis of the subjective and objective experimental 
results. Section 4.2 discusses the validation of the MOS results. Section 4.3 examines the 
MOS data from the VoIP WLANs. Section 4.4 discusses the results of objective 
measurements of the VoIP WLAN. Section 4.5 provides a summary of the overall 
analysis. 
 
4.2 Validation of MOS Results 
  
 This section explains how the MOS results are validated. Validation is 
accomplished by verifying that the subjective scores are normally distributed, eliminating 
the X-Lite recording process as a source of error, and by comparing MOS results from 
the 802.11b WLAN to an E-Model prediction. 
 In order to verify that the MOS results are not significantly skewed, subjective 
scores from each of the 28 scenarios are tested for normality using the Ryan-Jointer test. 
The null hypothesis for the Ryan-Joiner test is that the data is normally distributed. Data 
from all experiment scenarios pass the Ryan-Joiner test for normality (p-value > 0.1). 
 Since the human subjects hear and score recorded audio clips, it is necessary for 
the MOS for source (original) audio and its direct recording by the X-Lite softphone to be 
statistically equivalent. If the two are statistically equivalent, then the X-Lite recording 
process does not introduce error in the form of MOS decline. Figure 14 shows the MOS 
results for the source audio and the direct recordings into X-Lite for each of the three 
trials. Source audio receives an MOS of 4.45, and the 85% CI includes an MOS of 4.5, 
which is the highest possible MOS as explained in Section 2.7. This result demonstrates  
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Figure 14. MOS for Original Audio and Direct X-Lite Recordings 
 
 
that the source audio used for this experiment is of very high quality. Furthermore, the 
MOS for the direct recordings into X-Lite during Trials I, II, and III are all near 4.5 (4.48, 
4.41, and 4.40, respectively), and statistically equivalent to the original audio clip (85% 
CI). The recording process is therefore eliminated as a possible source of error for the 
MOS results. 
 The third method used to validate the subjective audio quality results is to 
compare them to an E-model prediction for a similar VoIP WLAN. E-model results from 
Nascimento, et al [NPM+06] predict MOS for G.711 calls made over an 802.11b WLAN 
with no encryption and an 802.11b WLAN secured with an IPsec Virtual Private 
Network (VPN). The MOS results from this research should fall between the E-model 
predictions from [NPM+06]. Figure 15 shows the E-model predictions as grey boxes 
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Figure 15. MOS and E-model Predictions for an 802.11b WLAN 
 
 
 
and the subjective MOS from this thesis with 85% CIs. The subjective MOS results are 
statistically equivalent to or lower than the E-model prediction for an unencrypted 
802.11b WLAN and statistically equivalent or higher than the E-model prediction for an 
802.11b WLAN secured with an IPsec VPN. The computational and bit overhead 
introduced by encryption levels used for this thesis (WPA2 or WPA2 and transport mode 
IPsec) fall between those in [NPM+06] (no encryption or IPsec VPN). Therefore, 
subjective MOS from this experiment over a secured 802.11b WLAN is consistent with 
the E-model results from [NPM+06]. This fact both validates the subjective MOS results 
from this experiment and the E-model prediction for MOS presented in [NPM+06]. 
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4.3 Subjective MOS Results  
 MOS results for 6 and 10 simultaneous calls over an 802.11b WLAN are 
displayed in Figure 16. The results are plotted in ascending order of utilized bandwidth, 
from 6 simultaneous calls secured with WPA2 to 10 simultaneous calls secured with both 
WPA2 and IPsec. Although MOS declines when IPsec is added during both 6 and 10 
calls, the declines are not statistically significant. However, the upper bound for possible 
decline in MOS due to IPsec is calculated by subtracting the lowest value of the 
WPA2+IPsec scenario CI from the high value of the WPA2 scenario CI. For an 802.11b 
WLAN, the upper bound for the decline in MOS due to IPsec is 0.59 during 6 calls, and 
0.55 for 10 calls (85% CI). The data are consistent with steady MOS decline across the 
four trials, but this decline is not statistically significant. 
 
 
Figure 16. MOS over an 802.11b WLAN (6 and 10 calls) 
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Figure 17. MOS over an 802.11g WLAN (6 and 10 calls) 
 
 
 Subjective MOS results for an 802.11g WLAN are shown in Figure 17. The 
results are plotted in ascending order of utilized bandwidth, from 6 simultaneous calls 
encrypted with WPA2 to 10 simultaneous calls encrypted with both WPA2 and IPsec. 
Unlike the steady decline in audio quality indicated by the 802.11b results, the 802.11g 
MOS results do not consistently decline across all four scenarios. During 6 calls secured 
with WPA2+IPsec, the MOS CI nearly falls below 3.0, while at 10 calls secured with 
WPA2+IPsec the MOS CI unexpectedly rises higher than for the other three 802.11g 
MOS CIs. The erratic nature of these MOS results suggests that the 802.11g WLAN 
experienced interference that randomly lowered the subjective scores. This problem is 
further investigated through objective measurements presented in Section 4.4 
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Figure 18. MOS over an 802.11n WLAN (6 and 10 calls) 
 
 
 Figure 18 shows the subjective MOS results for 6 and 10 simultaneous calls over 
802.11n. The number of subjects used to evaluate these scenarios is increased to 84 to 
provide the most precise MOS results for the 802.11n WLAN. Doubling the number of 
human subjects from 42 to 84 decreases the 85% CI  widths from approximately 0.4 to 
0.3. This small improvement in CI width illustrates the primary limitation of subjective 
testing: that a large number of subjects are required for precise results.  
 The data suggest that an increase from 6 to 10 calls or the addition of IPsec 
encryption does not result in a statistically significant MOS decline. This result is 
reasonable due to the large 802.11n bandwidth available to handle additional packet 
overhead and increased VoIP traffic. Upper bound for MOS decline due to IPsec is 0.38 
for 6 simultaneous calls and 0.35 for 10 calls over 802.11n. 
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Figure 19. MOS over 802.11b and 802.11n (6 and 10 calls) 
 
 When the subjective MOS results for 6 and 10 calls over an 802.11n WLAN are 
compared to results from an 802.11b WLAN, they are statistically equivalent. Figure 19 
shows the 85% CI for all 6 and 10 simultaneous call scenarios examined for 802.11b and 
802.11n. Note that the 802.11n MOS CIs are identifiable due to their relative narrowness. 
The p-value from an ANOVA test on the eight scenarios in Figure 19 is 0.93, indicating 
no statistically significant difference in MOS. The data suggest that although 802.11n 
offers significantly greater bandwidth than 802.11b, audio quality over an 802.11n 
WLAN is not significantly higher (or lower) than over an 802.11b WLAN for up to 10 
simultaneous G.711 calls encrypted with WPA2+IPsec, utilizing 1.872 Mbps (1872 bits x 
100 packets/sec x 10 calls). MOS results from 802.11g are not included in this 
comparison due to possible interference effects observed over the 802.11g WLAN. 
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Figure 20. MOS over an 802.11n WLAN (2 and 4 calls) 
 
 
 In addition to the 6 and 10 call scenarios, 2, 4, 14, and 20 simultaneous calls are 
subjectively rated for the 802.11n WLAN. Figure 20 shows the MOS results for 2 and 4 
simultaneous calls over an 802.11n WLAN. No statistically significant MOS decline is 
observed when the number of calls increases from 2 to 4 or when IPsec is added. This 
result is as expected due to the low utilization (< 750 kbps) of these scenarios (1872 bits 
x 100 packets/sec x 4 calls). During 2 calls, the upper bound for the decline in MOS as a 
result of IPsec encryption is 0.34 for 2 simultaneous calls and 0.51 for 4 simultaneous 
calls over 802.11n. 
 Although no significantly significant MOS decline is observed for 2 or 4 calls 
over 802.11n, the results are consistent with a small but steady decline across the 4 
scenarios shown in Figure 20.  
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Figure 21. MOS over an 802.11n WLAN (14 and 20 calls) 
 
 
 Figure 21 shows the subjective MOS results for 14 and 20 simultaneous calls over 
an 802.11n WLAN. The data do not suggest a statistically significant decline in MOS 
when IPsec is added at either call level. Upper bound for MOS decline due to IPsec 
encryption is 0.68 for 14 simultaneous calls and 0.42 for 20 calls over 802.11n. 
Results suggest that MOS over an 802.11n WLAN with 20 simultaneous calls and 
secured with both WPA2 or WPA2+IPsec encryption are significantly lower (85% CI) 
than for an 802.11n WLAN with 14 simultaneous calls secured with WPA2. This is the 
first subjective result to indicate a definitive MOS decline due to additional calls. 
Furthermore, the MOS data confirms that the relatively small bandwidth utilized by 20 
G.711 calls (< 4 Mbps) is sufficient to cause MOS decline over an 802.11n WLAN.  
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Figure 22. MOS over an 802.11n WLAN (2 and 20 calls) 
 
 Figure 22 illustrates the subjective MOS results for 2 and 20 calls over an 802.11n 
WLAN. From Figure 22 it is clear that MOS for 2 calls secured with WPA2+IPsec over 
802.11n is significantly higher than for both 20 call scenarios over 802.11n. This result 
suggests that the large bandwidth available on an 802.11n WLAN does not prevent a 
statistically significant decline in MOS when the number of calls increases from 2 to 20. 
The results also suggest that MOS decline due to IPsec MOS is much lower than that 
caused by additional calls. This result is as expected, since the bit overhead required by 
IPsec is less than that generated by additional calls. For instance, securing 20 calls with 
IPsec adds 544 kbps (272 bits x 100 packets/sec x 20 calls), while adding 20 unencrypted 
calls generates 3.2 Mbps (1,600 bits x 100 packets/sec x 20 calls). 
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Figure 23. Fitted Line Plot for Subjective MOS over 802.11n (WPA2) 
 
 With MOS results for six different call levels over 802.11n, it is possible to 
calculate a regression line of best fit to estimate MOS for call levels not examined during 
this experiment. Figure 23 shows the fitted line plot for subjective MOS over a WPA2 
secured 802.11n WLAN. The formula for the regression line is 
       Subjective MOS = 3.5 – 0.0067(# of calls)                (3) 
and predicts that MOS falls below 3.0 (fair quality) during 75 simultaneous G.711 calls 
encrypted with WPA2. Predictions by (3) are statistically equivalent to all 6 subjective 
MOS results for a WPA2 secured 802.11n WLAN, confirming its accuracy. The highest 
possible MOS predicted by (3) is 3.5 for a single G.711 call on the 802.11n WLAN 
secured with WPA2. This strongly suggests, as do the subjective MOS results, that toll 
quality audio (MOS ≥ 4.0) is not practical over a WPA2-secured 802.11n WLAN, even 
with the G.711 codec. 
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Figure 24. Fitted Line Plot for Subjective MOS over 802.11n (WPA2+IPsec) 
 
  Figure 24 shows the fitted line plot for subjective MOS over an 802.11n WLAN 
encrypted with both WPA2 and IPsec. The formula for the regression line is 
      Subjective MOS = 3.5 – 0.0127(# of calls)                                (4) 
and predicts that subjective MOS falls below 3.0 (fair quality) during 40 simultaneous 
G.711 calls encrypted with WPA2 and IPsec. Predictions by (4) are statistically 
equivalent to all 6 subjective MOS results for an 802.11n WLAN secured with WPA2 
and IPsec, confirming its accuracy. These predicted declines in MOS are also well within 
the upper bounds presented in Figures 18, 20, and 21. The highest possible MOS 
predicted by (4) is 3.5 for a single G.711 call on the 802.11n WLAN secured with 
WPA2+IPsec. This strongly suggests, as do the subjective MOS results, that toll quality 
audio (MOS ≥ 4.0) is not practical over an 802.11n WLAN secured with WPA2 and 
IPsec, even with the high quality G.711 codec. 
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 MOS decline due to IPsec is predicted by subtracting (3) from (4). The result is  
             MOS Decline due to IPsec = 0.006(# of calls)                    (5) 
which predicts a very small MOS decline over an 802.11n WLAN due to securing G.711 
calls with IPsec. MOS decline predicted by (5) is well within the upper bounds calculated 
by comparing MOS CIs between WPA2 and WPA2+IPsec scenarios at every call level.  
4.4 Objective VoIP WLAN Measurements 
 In order to investigate the cause of the anomalous MOS results for the 802.11g 
WLAN, objective measurements of VoIP traffic performance are collected. The open-
source network packet analyzer Wireshark is used to report statistics on packet loss, 
maximum latency, mean jitter, and maximum jitter. Wireshark can only provide these 
statistics if it can interpret the RTP stream of a VoIP call, so when IPsec is implemented 
Wireshark can no longer readily analyze VoIP traffic. Therefore 10 simultaneous calls 
encrypted with WPA2 is selected as the scenario to evaluate the statistical traffic 
differences between 802.11b, 802.11g, and 802.11n WLANs. Thirty-four additional 60-
second calls are analyzed for each 802.11 extension to collect the following data. The 
number of objective trials is selected to be greater than 30 in order to give a reasonable 
expectation of distribution normality. Calls are 60 seconds long in order to scrutinize 
WLAN performance for anomalies over a significant length of time.  
 For all three 802.11 extensions, the average packet loss is less than 1%. This 
value is well below the maximum packet loss of 3% advised by NIST [NIS05]. 
 Figure 25 shows mean jitter during a 60-second call for the three WLANs. Mean 
jitter is low for all three 802.11 extensions, with means less than 6 ms (85% CI). 
Although the mean jitters are all low, mean jitter over the 802.11g WLAN is significantly  
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Figure 25. Mean Jitter During a 60-Second Call over the 802.11 WLANs 
 
greater (85% CI) than the 802.11b and 802.11n WLANs. The results over 802.11b and 
802.11n are statistically equivalent. The 802.11g data has a wider CI due in part to two 
calls where mean jitter is over 14 ms. The mean jitter over 802.11b and 802.11n does not 
exceed 10 ms. This data is evidence that the 802.11g WLAN is more affected by RFI 
than the other WLANs, since in every other respect the WLANs are identical. 
 Figure 26 shows maximum jitter during a 60-second call over the three 802.11 
extensions. The data indicate that maximum jitter over 802.11g is significantly higher 
than for both 802.11b and 802.11n. High variability in maximum jitter over 802.11g, 
including 4 calls where jitter exceeds 50 ms, results in a noticeably wider 85% CI. 
Average maximum jitter performance over the 802.11n WLAN is measurably superior to 
the 802.11b WLAN, albeit by a short time of between 1.4 and 4.4 ms (85% CI).  
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Figure 26. Maximum Jitter During a 60-Second Call over the 802.11 WLANs 
 
 Figure 27 shows the maximum latency during a 60-second call over the three 
802.11 WLANs. As with the jitter measurements, average maximum latency over the 
802.11g WLAN is greater than over both 802.11b and 802.11n by at least 100 ms (85% 
CI). Maximum latency over the 802.11b and 802.11n WLANs are not statistically 
different from one another and are both below 111 ms (85% CI). Objective measurements 
of jitter and latency therefore support the subjective MOS data that suggest equivalent 
audio quality of 802.11b and 802.11n when 10 simultaneous G.711 calls are present. 
 From the objective data it is evident that the 802.11g WLAN is significantly 
affected by RFI, while the 802.11b and 802.11n WLANs are not. In turn, this RFI 
randomly lowers subjective audio quality scores for 802.11g WLAN scenarios. The most 
likely cause of this interference is the presence of other 802.11g APs around the  
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Figure 27. Maximum Latency During a 60-Second Call over the 802.11 WLANs 
 
experimental facility. The different wireless encoding scheme of 802.11b (DSSS) and the 
wider channel width of 802.11n (40 MHz) make those two WLANs less vulnerable to 
interference from nearby 802.11g (OFDM) APs. 
4.5 Summary 
 This chapter presents an analysis of the subjective and objective data collected for 
this experiment. The subjective audio scores are validated and compared to fulfill the 
experimental goals. Finally, objective measurements of WLAN VoIP traffic are presented 
to explain the anomalous MOS results from the 802.11g WLAN. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Introduction 
 This chapter summarizes the overall conclusions of the research. Section 5.2 
presents conclusions derived from the experimental data. Section 5.3 discusses the 
significance of this research. Finally, Section 5.4 outlines recommendations for future 
research. 
5.2 Conclusions of Research 
5.2.1 Goal 1: Determine if MOS is higher over 802.11n than 802.11b or 802.11g 
   
Subjective MOS over an 802.11n WLAN is shown to be no higher than over an 
802.11b WLAN for up to 10 simultaneous G.711 VoIP calls. The large available 
throughput of 802.11n therefore does not result in higher subjective MOS than the much 
slower 802.11b extension under low WLAN utilization (< 2 Mbps). Subjective results 
from the 802.11g WLAN cannot be reliably compared to those from the 802.11n WLAN 
because interference affects from neighboring 802.11g APs is detected. Toll quality voice 
(MOS ≥ 4.0) is not attained using any of the three 802.11 extensions (85% CI).  
5.2.2 Goal 2: Quantify MOS Decline over 802.11n Due to Additional Calls 
 
 Subjective MOS results from the 802.11n WLAN decline as the traffic increases 
from 2 to 20 simultaneous G.711 calls. Linear regression models of the subjective MOS 
results suggest that MOS decline is directly proportional to the number of simultaneous 
calls. These models are statistically consistent with the experiment results and predict that 
MOS falls below 3.0 (fair quality) during 75 simultaneous calls when WPA2 is used or 
40 calls when WPA2 and IPsec are both used.  
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5.2.2 Goal 3: Quantify MOS Decline over 802.11n Due to IPsec 
 
 MOS decline due to IPsec is too small to be determined directly through 
subjective measurements at each call level. However, MOS decline due to IPsec is 
quantified by (5), which is the difference between MOS models (3) and (4). MOS decline 
due to IPsec is predicted to be only 0.006 for one call but increase to 0.24 during 40 
simultaneous calls. This prediction is well within the upper bounds calculated by 
comparing subjective MOS results at each call level. 
5.3 Significance of Research 
 WLANs and VoIP are both technologies with serious inherent security risks. 
Without strong encryption, such as WPA2, intruders can gain remote access into a 
corporate WLAN without needing to even step foot inside the building. However, WPA2 
does not protect the privacy of VoIP calls from other authenticated clients on the WLAN. 
VoIP must therefore be encrypted separately from the WLAN, with protocols such as 
SRTP or IPsec.  
 This thesis presents models, based on and verified by subjective trials, which 
quantify call quality over the new draft 802.11n standard. MOS decline due to IPsec is 
also quantified. The research suggests that VoIP over 802.11n WLANs is not appropriate 
for DoD applications where toll quality voice (MOS ≥ 4.0) is essential. The research also 
suggests that IPsec encryption does not cause a dramatic decline in audio quality and is a 
viable method for securing WLAN VoIP calls. The results from this thesis validate E-
model predictions by Nascimento, et al [NPM+06] for MOS over an 802.11b WLAN and 
should also be used to validate future models and simulations of audio quality over secure 
802.11n WLANs as well. 
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5.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
 This thesis examines audio quality over AP-based WLANs, but more complex 
topologies such as multi-hop and ad hoc are also capable of supporting VoIP calls. The 
impact of encryption on MOS over other WLAN topologies should be thoroughly 
investigated. Future work should also focus on quantifying the impact of encryption on 
MOS over other wireless protocols used for VoIP calls, such as Bluetooth (IEEE 802.15) 
and WiMax (IEEE 802.16).  
 G.711 is selected as the codec for this thesis research, but more compressed 
codecs are also popular for VoIP, including G.729. The impact of strong WLAN 
encryption on compressed codecs is likely to be more severe than on G.711 because of 
their greater sensitivity to packet loss and latency. Future research should quantify these 
effects. 
 Finally, this research examined WLANs that support only VoIP traffic. In 
workplace WLANs, it is possible that VoIP calls could share wireless bandwidth with 
other activity such as email and file transfers. The complex impact that network 
congestion and QoS have on WLAN audio quality warrants further study. 
5.5 Summary  
 This chapter presents conclusions from the research. The research significance 
and recommendations for future work are also discussed. 
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Appendix A. Scenario Listening Orders by Subject 
 
Trial I: 
 
                   Scenario Listening Order 
Subject # 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 
1 3 14 4 8 6 5 1 9 12 7 2 13 11 10 
2 11 8 12 2 14 13 9 3 6 1 10 7 5 4 
3 5 2 6 10 8 7 3 11 14 9 4 1 13 12 
4 2 13 3 7 5 4 14 8 11 6 1 12 10 9 
5 13 10 14 4 2 1 11 5 8 3 12 9 7 6 
6 12 9 13 3 1 14 10 4 7 2 11 8 6 5 
7 6 3 7 11 9 8 4 12 1 10 5 2 14 13 
8 9 6 10 14 12 11 7 1 4 13 8 5 3 2 
9 1 12 2 6 4 3 13 7 10 5 14 11 9 8 
10 7 4 8 12 10 9 5 13 2 11 6 3 1 14 
11 4 1 5 9 7 6 2 10 13 8 3 14 12 11 
12 14 11 1 5 3 2 12 6 9 4 13 10 8 7 
13 8 5 9 13 11 10 6 14 3 12 7 4 2 1 
14 10 7 11 1 13 12 8 2 5 14 9 6 4 3 
15 1 10 11 13 9 4 8 6 14 3 12 2 7 5 
16 12 7 8 10 6 1 5 3 11 14 9 13 4 2 
17 14 9 10 12 8 3 7 5 13 2 11 1 6 4 
18 9 4 5 7 3 12 2 14 8 11 6 10 1 13 
19 13 8 9 11 7 2 6 4 12 1 10 14 5 3 
20 6 1 2 4 14 9 13 11 5 8 3 7 12 10 
21 3 12 13 1 11 6 10 8 2 5 14 4 9 7 
22 5 14 1 3 13 8 12 10 4 7 2 6 11 9 
23 8 3 4 6 2 11 1 13 7 10 5 9 14 12 
24 10 5 6 8 4 13 3 1 9 12 7 11 2 14 
25 2 11 12 14 10 5 9 7 1 4 13 3 8 6 
26 11 6 7 9 5 14 4 2 10 13 8 12 3 1 
27 7 2 3 5 1 10 14 12 6 9 4 8 13 11 
28 4 13 14 2 12 7 11 9 3 6 1 5 10 8 
29 1 2 5 10 4 1 7 6 3 12 8 14 11 9 
30 14 3 6 11 5 2 8 7 4 13 9 1 12 10 
31 12 1 4 9 3 14 6 5 2 11 7 13 10 8 
32 2 5 8 13 7 4 10 9 6 1 11 3 14 12 
33 6 9 12 3 11 8 14 13 10 5 1 7 4 2 
34 1 4 7 12 6 3 9 8 5 14 10 2 13 11 
35 5 8 11 2 10 7 13 12 9 4 14 6 3 1 
36 9 12 1 6 14 11 3 2 13 8 4 10 7 5 
37 11 14 3 8 2 13 5 4 1 10 6 12 9 7 
38 10 13 2 7 1 12 4 3 14 9 5 11 8 6 
39 8 11 14 5 13 10 2 1 12 7 3 9 6 4 
40 4 7 10 1 9 6 12 11 8 3 13 5 2 14 
41 3 6 9 14 8 5 11 10 7 2 12 4 1 13 
42 7 10 13 4 12 9 1 14 11 6 2 8 5 3 
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Trial II: 
 
                             Scenario Listening Order 
Subject # 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
43 16 18 19 15 20 17 21 
44 21 16 17 20 18 15 19 
45 18 20 21 17 15 19 16 
46 17 19 20 16 21 18 15 
47 20 15 16 19 17 21 18 
48 19 21 15 18 16 20 17 
49 15 17 18 21 19 16 20 
50 16 17 19 18 21 20 15 
51 17 18 20 19 15 21 16 
52 18 19 21 20 16 15 17 
53 21 15 17 16 19 18 20 
54 15 16 18 17 20 19 21 
55 20 21 16 15 18 17 19 
56 19 20 15 21 17 16 18 
57 16 20 17 19 21 15 18 
58 15 19 16 18 20 21 17 
59 21 18 15 17 19 20 16 
60 18 15 19 21 16 17 20 
61 20 17 21 16 18 19 15 
62 17 21 18 20 15 16 19 
63 19 16 20 15 17 18 21 
64 19 21 15 17 18 16 20 
65 21 16 17 19 20 18 15 
66 18 20 21 16 17 15 19 
67 16 18 19 21 15 20 17 
68 20 15 16 18 19 17 21 
69 17 19 20 15 16 21 18 
70 15 17 18 20 21 19 16 
71 19 20 18 21 15 17 16 
72 16 17 15 18 19 21 20 
73 15 16 21 17 18 20 19 
74 18 19 17 20 21 16 15 
75 21 15 20 16 17 19 18 
76 20 21 19 15 16 18 17 
77 17 18 16 19 20 15 21 
78 16 21 18 17 19 15 20 
79 19 17 21 20 15 18 16 
80 21 19 16 15 17 20 18 
81 18 16 20 19 21 17 15 
82 20 18 15 21 16 19 17 
83 15 20 17 16 18 21 19 
84 17 15 19 18 20 16 21 
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Trial III: 
 
                            Scenario Listening Order 
Subject # 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
85 23 25 26 22 27 24 28 
86 28 23 24 27 25 22 26 
87 25 27 28 24 22 26 23 
88 24 26 27 23 28 25 22 
89 27 22 23 26 24 28 25 
90 26 28 22 25 23 27 24 
91 22 24 25 28 26 23 27 
92 23 24 26 25 28 27 22 
93 24 25 27 26 22 28 23 
94 25 26 28 27 23 22 24 
95 28 22 24 23 26 25 27 
96 22 23 25 24 27 26 28 
97 27 28 23 22 25 24 26 
98 26 27 22 28 24 23 25 
99 23 27 24 26 28 22 25 
100 22 26 23 25 27 28 24 
101 28 25 22 24 26 27 23 
102 25 22 26 28 23 24 27 
103 27 24 28 23 25 26 22 
104 24 28 25 27 22 23 26 
105 26 23 27 22 24 25 28 
106 26 28 22 24 25 23 27 
107 28 23 24 26 27 25 22 
108 25 27 28 23 24 22 26 
109 23 25 26 28 22 27 24 
110 27 22 23 25 26 24 28 
111 24 26 27 22 23 28 25 
112 22 24 25 27 28 26 23 
113 26 27 25 28 22 24 23 
114 23 24 22 25 26 28 27 
115 22 23 28 24 25 27 26 
116 25 26 24 27 28 23 22 
117 28 22 27 23 24 26 25 
118 27 28 26 22 23 25 24 
119 24 25 23 26 27 22 28 
120 23 28 25 24 26 22 27 
121 26 24 28 27 22 25 23 
122 28 26 23 22 24 27 25 
123 25 23 27 26 28 24 22 
124 27 25 22 28 23 26 24 
125 22 27 24 23 25 28 26 
126 24 22 26 25 27 23 28 
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Appendix B. Request for Exemption from Human Experimentation Requirements 
           
20 August 2008 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR AFIT IRB REVIEWER 
 
FROM:  AFIT/ENG (Dr. Mullins) 
  2950 Hobson Way 
  Bldg 640 
  Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-7765 
    
SUBJECT:  Request for exemption from human experimentation requirements (32 CFR 
219, DoDD 3216.2 and AFI 40-402) for Research on Secure Wireless Voice Networks 
 
1. The purpose of this study is to determine how Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) and 
the number of simultaneous Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) calls on a wireless 
network affect the perceived voice call quality.  A group of 42 volunteers listen to voice 
recordings taken from the wireless network and rate the call quality of each on a scale 
from 1 (bad) to 5 (excellent). 
 
2. This request is based on the Code of Federal Regulations, title 32, part 219, section 
101, paragraph (b) (2) Research activities that involve the use of educational tests 
(cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures, 
or observation of public behavior unless:  (i) Information obtained is recorded in such a 
manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the 
subjects; and (ii) Any disclosure of the human subjects’ responses outside the research 
could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to 
the subjects’ financial standing, employability, or reputation.   
  
3. The following information is provided to show cause for such an exemption: 
 
a) Equipment and facilities: The wireless VoIP network consists of 10 laptop 
computers with wireless cards, a wireless router, and microphone headsets.  Data 
collection takes place in building 640, room 245.  Subjects listen to the audio samples 
in the AFIT library. 
 
b) Subjects: Subjects are 42 volunteers from among the approximately 750 personnel 
assigned to AFIT.  Recruitment is performed via an email invitation to AFIT 
personnel.  
 
c) Timeframe: The study takes place from 20 August 2008 to 31 December 2008. 
 
d) Data collected: This study will not collect personal identifiers or specific 
demographic information.  Subjects are presented with 14 voice recordings taken 
from actual traffic on the wireless network.  Upon listening to each recording, the 
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subject rates the call quality on a scale from 1 (bad) to 5 (excellent).  The instructions 
given to subjects are included as Attachment 1. 
 
e) Risks to Subjects: Subjects could be exposed to uncomfortably loud recordings if 
the volume is not set correctly.  This threat is mitigated by calibrating the volume 
before each test. 
 
f) Informed consent: All subjects are self-selected to volunteer to participate in the 
interview.  No adverse action is taken against those who choose not to participate.  
Subjects are made aware of the nature and purpose of the research, sponsors of the 
research, and disposition of the survey results.   
 
g) If a subject’s future response reasonably places them at risk of criminal or civil 
liability or is damaging to their financial standing, employability, or reputation, I 
understand I am required to immediately file an adverse event report with the IRB 
office. 
 
4. If you have any questions about this request, please contact 1st Lt Benjamin Ramsey 
 –  phone (919) 604-0956; e-mail – benjamin.ramsey@afit.edu 
 
 
 
 
                                             BARRY E. MULLINS, Ph.D., P.E. 
                                             Assistant Professor of Computer Engineering 
                                             Principal Investigator 
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Appendix C. Human Subject Information Sheet 
 
 
 Subject Information Sheet 
 
For Research on Encrypted Wireless Voice Networks 
 
 
 You are invited to participate in a research study on secure wireless voice networks.  This 
research is to be conducted by 1st Lt Benjamin Ramsey, USAF.  This research is in partial 
fulfillment of a Master’s Degree program at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT).  The 
objective of this study is to determine ways to improve secure voice communication links over 
wireless networks. 
 
 You will hear a series of voice recordings from a wireless communication network, and 
will evaluate your impression of the voice quality by answering the following question about each 
recording: 
 
LISTENING QUALITY SCALE 
       Excellent  5 
      Good      4 
      Fair                  3 
      Poor       2 
       Bad   1 
 
 Your participation is COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY.  However, your input is important 
to improving analytical models for wireless secure voice capacities.  You may withdraw from this 
study at any time without penalty, and your personal information will not be used in the research.  
Your decision to participate or withdraw will not jeopardize your relationship with your 
organization, the Air Force Institute of Technology, the Air Force, or the Department of Defense. 
 If you have any questions about this request, please contact 1st Lt Benjamin Ramsey at 
benjamin.ramsey@afit.edu 
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Appendix D. IPsec Configuration Files for Linux 
 
 
 The following configuration files are used to enable transport-mode IPsec on the 
trixbox PBX. The following four files (psk.txt, setkey.config, raccoon.log, and ipsecstart) 
are placed in the /etc/raccoon directory after ipsectools has been installed. IPsec is 
enabled by the command “./ipsecstart” from the raccoon directory. 
 
psk.txt 
# Private Shared Keys for IPsec with 20 softphone laptops 
 
# IP address   KEY 
 
192.168.0.10 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.11 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.12 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.13 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.14 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.15 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.16 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.17 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.18 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.19 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.20 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.21 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.22 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.23 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.24 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.25 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.26 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.27 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.28 123456789012345678901234 
192.168.0.29 123456789012345678901234 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
setkey.config 
 
# IPsec rules for incoming and outgoing communication 
# IP address of PBX is 192.168.0.2 
# IP address range of softphone laptops is 192.168.0.10-29 
 
flush; 
spdflush;  
 
#192.168.0.10 
spdadd 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.10 any –P out ipsec 
 esp/transport//require; 
spdadd 192.168.0.10 192.168.0.2 any –P in ipsec 
 esp/transport//require; 
 
#192.168.0.11 
spdadd 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.11 any –P out ipsec 
 esp/transport//require; 
spdadd 192.168.0.11 192.168.0.2 any –P in ipsec 
 esp/transport//require; 
 
#192.168.0.12 
spdadd 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.12 any –P out ipsec 
 esp/transport//require; 
spdadd 192.168.0.12 192.168.0.2 any –P in ipsec 
 esp/transport//require; 
 
 
#192.168.0.13 
spdadd 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.13 any –P out ipsec 
 esp/transport//require; 
spdadd 192.168.0.13 192.168.0.2 any –P in ipsec 
 esp/transport//require; 
 
. 
. 
. 
 
 
#192.168.0.29 
spdadd 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.29 any –P out ipsec 
 esp/transport//require; 
spdadd 192.168.0.29 192.168.0.2 any –P in ipsec 
 esp/transport//require; 
 
 
69 
 
racoon.conf 
 
path pre_shared_key “/etc/racoon/psk.txt” ; 
 
remote anonymous 
{ 
 exchange_mode main ; 
 proposal { 
  encryption_algorithm 3des ; 
  hash_algorithm sha1 ; 
  authentication_method pre_shared_key ; 
  dh_group 2 ; 
  } 
} 
 
sainfo anonymous 
{ 
 encryption_algorithm 3des ; 
 authentication_algorithm hmac_sha1 ; 
 compression_algorithm deflate ; 
} 
 
 
 
ipsecstart 
#!/bin/sh 
clear 
ifconfig eth0 mtu 1400 
killall racoon 
sleep 1s 
chmod 0600 /etc/racoon/psk.txt 
setkey –F 
setkey –FP 
setkey –f /etc/racoon/setkey.config 
setkey –D 
setkey –DP 
racoon –f /etc/racoon/racoon.conf 
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Appendix E. IPsec Configuration Guide for Windows XP 
 
 
 This guide demonstrates how transport mode 3DES IPsec is configured for the 
softphone laptops running Windows XP. 
 
1. Open Administrative Tools and click on Local Security Policy 
 
 
2. Create a new policy 
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3. Select Require Security and Preshared Key under the security rules of the new policy 
 
 
4. Select 3DES for ESP Confidentiality and SHA1 for ESP Integrity 
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5. Enter the 24-character Preshared Key 
 
 
 
 
6. Transport mode IPsec does not require a specified IPsec tunnel. 
 
 
 
 
7. Start IPsec by assigning the newly created policy under Local Security Settings. 
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Appendix F. Raw Subjective Audio Quality Scores 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
4 3 4 3 4 4 2 3 3 2 4 3 5 4 5 3 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 3 2 2 4
3 3 2 2 2 3 2 5 3 3 4 4 4 5 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 4 2 3 3 2 3 4
4 4 4 3 4 5 4 5 4 4 3 4 5 5 4 5 3 4 3 4 5 4 4 5 4 3 3 5
4 2 3 3 3 2 4 3 1 4 2 1 4 5 4 4 4 5 3 3 4 4 3 4 1 3 3 4
3 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 5 4 4 5 5 4 3 5 3 5 4 5 4 5 3 4 4 4 5
3 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 5 5 2 2 4 2 1 2 5 3 4 4 4 3 4 4
4 5 2 5 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 3 5 4 5
4 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 2 4 3 3 3 4 5 2 3 3 3 4 4
1 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 4 3 3 4 5 3 2 4 4 3 3 5
4 1 5 2 3 3 2 2 3 1 2 2 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 5 4 3 3 3 4 4 5
3 3 3 4 4 2 3 4 2 3 2 4 4 5 3 2 4 3 3 2 3 3 4 4 3 5 4 5
4 3 3 2 3 3 2 1 2 2 3 2 3 3 4 3 4 4 5 2 5 4 5 4 5 4 3 4
3 3 4 3 4 4 5 5 3 4 5 4 4 5 4 3 4 4 5 4 5 4 3 3 5 5 2 4
3 3 2 3 5 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 5 4 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 4 3 5 4 4 4
3 4 2 3 3 4 3 2 2 2 2 3 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 3 5 4 4 5 5 3 3 5
4 4 3 3 4 5 3 3 4 5 3 4 5 5 4 3 3 4 2 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
5 2 3 4 4 4 3 4 2 2 2 2 5 3 4 5 5 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 2 4 4
4 3 5 3 5 3 4 2 4 2 2 3 5 4 4 5 3 4 4 4 5 3 5 1 4 1 3 5
4 2 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 5 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 5 4 5 4 3 4
4 3 2 3 3 3 5 4 3 4 3 5 4 3 2 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 4 1 3 3 4
5 3 4 4 2 4 3 3 4 5 5 4 5 5 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 2 3 3 3 4 5
5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 3 2 4 3 2 2 4 4 3 4 3 2 1 5
4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 5 3 3 5 4 3 5 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4
4 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 1 2 1 3 2 4 5 3 3 3 4 5 3 4
5 4 2 2 3 4 2 3 4 3 4 3 5 5 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 4 5 4 5 4 3 5
4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 3 4 3 5 4 3 4 1 3 3 4
4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 5 5 2 3 3 3 4 5
4 4 3 5 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 5 4 4 4 3 2 2 5
4 4 4 4 4 5 4 3 4 4 3 4 5 5 3 4 3 4 4 4 5 3 3 2 4 3 1 3
1 3 3 4 1 1 4 3 1 3 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 1 2 3 4 3 1 4
5 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 3 3 3 3 4
4 3 3 3 3 3 5 4 4 3 4 3 5 5 3 5 4 4 4 3 5 2 3 4 2 3 3 4
4 5 4 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 2 3 5 5 2 3 2 4 3 3 3 4 2 4 1 3 3 4
4 4 5 2 3 3 3 3 4 5 3 3 2 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 1 5 4 3 2 4 5
4 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 1 4 4 3 3 3 4
2 5 5 4 4 3 3 5 3 3 4 2 5 4 4 4 5 3 3 3 4 2 5 3 4 4 3 4
3 5 3 2 3 3 4 3 2 2 4 3 5 5 2 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 1 4 4
1 3 3 2 4 3 4 2 1 4 2 5 4 5 3 3 1 4 3 3 2 3 3 4 2 2 5 5
2 3 4 3 3 3 4 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 3 4 2 4 4 4 5 3 4 5 5 4 4 5
5 4 4 4 4 4 5 3 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 3 4 3 4 5 4 2 4 3 3 3 4
4 4 4 5 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 5 4 4 3 2 3 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 5
2 4 3 4 5 3 5 2 3 4 4 3 5 5 3 4 4 4 3 4 5 4 3 4 3 3 3 4
Scenario #
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Appendix G. Raw Objective Measurements of Wireless VoIP Traffic Performance 
 
 
Max Latency Max Jitter Mean Jitter Max Latency Max Jitter Mean Jitter Max Latency Max Jitter Mean Jitter
78.59 11.57 2.78 69.41 6.23 1.47 274.04 21.41 5.42
80.46 13.87 3.07 72.13 8.14 1.89 71.68 6.64 1.68
86.63 12.02 2.51 1925.34 517.35 15.56 71.81 6.73 1.79
84.45 13.56 4.25 1925.34 517.35 15.56 79.14 7 1.73
84.8 16.97 9.7 7148 68.53 7.48 81.03 12.36 6.02
79.92 14.51 4.7 76.39 7.78 1.68 78.29 13.54 8.04
81.76 12.28 2.75 68.49 6.27 1.78 70.64 7.13 1.83
93.89 12.95 2.57 74.1 7.51 2.03 74.47 6.62 1.73
99.3 14.92 4.11 81.83 12.4 6.18 361.28 22.33 2.42
143.64 16.25 6.3 87.99 11.49 4.51 79.01 11.67 7.22
98.83 12.53 2.53 81.57 11.85 7.21 93.51 11.23 3.79
104.44 13.92 2.59 70.43 7.69 2.3 77.01 7.23 2.04
80.89 12.01 2.9 77.46 11.11 4.63 74.2 7.39 1.8
92.02 11.84 2.71 77.9 8.69 2.94 74.04 6.95 1.88
112.57 12 2.51 77.8 8.75 2.42 74.78 7.01 1.88
84.23 13.1 2.69 75.02 6.82 1.79 71.96 6.83 1.8
116.25 12.9 2.55 77.58 6.94 1.95 73.69 8.15 2.06
103.84 13.12 3.34 71.18 7.59 1.95 74.26 11.44 7.03
82.2 12.73 5.34 83.55 11.17 3.77 76.81 10 3.82
102.82 12.9 3.12 76.57 11.57 6.89 68.59 6.26 1.82
76.28 12.92 2.72 76.65 7.12 1.89 72.9 7.18 1.87
92.5 11.64 2.49 40.19 8.97 4.56 71.53 6.5 1.91
81.5 12.11 2.52 2223.33 140.14 7.6 75.2 6.75 1.9
104.01 12.15 2.4 89.84 14.06 4.41 81.56 13.36 6.77
81.26 12.22 2.37 95.16 11.77 5 198.97 17.37 2.86
110.3 11.92 2.5 82.37 12.59 5.36 76 9.14 4.64
101.05 13.09 3.39 91.15 11.82 5.26 83.78 9.7 3.93
93.26 15.26 7.26 81.03 11.99 5.4 79.47 7.33 1.9
95.06 16.47 7.22 91.08 13.23 5.41 75.6 7.16 2.01
81.87 12.47 3.3 90.39 11.58 5.54 243.1 16.24 2.2
98.35 13.28 2.86 82.22 11.7 5.54 75.12 7.08 1.96
77.73 12.53 2.55 87 11.14 1.74 167.66 14.6 2.07
76.34 12.65 2.74 7278.97 17.34 9.75 189.16 14.03 2.1
104.53 15.57 6.37 378.39 20.14 10.68 256.4 17.41 2.18
802.11b WLAN 802.11n WLAN802.11g WLAN
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